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JOHN FIELD SIMMS MEMORIAL LECTURE SERIES:
CONSTITUTIONAL VANDALISM
DAVID E. KENDALL*
Fans of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle may know that in an early draft of The Hound
of the Baskervilles Sherlock Holmes and Watson find they have to camp out on
Dartmoor for the night. In the middle of the night, Holmes woke up and shook
Watson, declaring: "Look at the sky, Watson, what do you see?" Watson replied,
"I see stars, millions and millions of stars." "And what does that tell you, Watson?"
Dr. Watson paused before replying, and finally said: "Astronomically, it tells me
that there are millions of galaxies and countless planets in them. Astrologically, it
tells me that Saturn is in Leo. Horologically, it tells me the time is a quarter past
three. Theologically, it tells me that God is all powerful and we are small and
insignificant. Meteorologically, it tells me we will have a nice day tomorrow."
Holmes was silent. Finally Watson asked, "Well, Holmes, what does all this beauty
and grandeur tell you?" The great detective snapped, "Watson, you idiot, it tells me
someone has stolen our tent."
I do not pretend to have the perspicacity of a Sherlock Holmes, but I want to
inquire into what the recent impeachment proceedings really tell us about the state
of our constitutional procedures. In particular, I want to address the institutional
performance of the House of Representatives in the recent impeachment of
President Clinton.
I begin with an obvious disclaimer: as the President's counsel, I pretend to no
neutral detachment or objectivity. I make no apologies for being a partisan, because
I represented a client in this matter, and I have represented the President and Mrs.
Clinton as their personal counsel since 1993.
But all that said, I think it is still possible for me to offer a reasoned and I hope
useful critique of the process followed by the House in 1998. For it should be
possible to focus on the procedures followed, and not on the substance nor the
personalities, and ask whether those procedures would recommend themselves to
(say) a Henry Hyde, who was attempting to defend the impeachment of a
Republican President. Call it the Golden Rule analysis-would the House Judiciary
Committee Republicans really want to see the same procedures followed if a
George W. Bush, a John McCain, or a Steve Forbes, were in the dock? I believe the
answer is obvious, since my views are summarized in the title of my remarks: I
think the institutional performance of the House of Representatives was so abysmal
as to amount to constitutional vandalism.
I make one other preliminary point. The President has repeatedly acknowledged
that what he did with Ms. Lewinsky was wrong,'and his counsel have not attempted
* David Kendall, a partner in the Washington, D.C. firm of Williams & Connolly, has served as President
Clinton's personal counsel in all matters other than the Paula Jones case. A Rhodes Scholar and a graduate of Yale
Law School, he clerked for Supreme Court Justice Byron White. He also currently serves as an adjunct professor
at Georgetown University Law School. This article is based on his presentation in the John Field Simms Memorial
Lecture Series at the University of New Mexico School of Law, Albuquerque, New Mexico, February 3. 2000.
1. Counsel for the President began their formal submission to the House Judiciary Committee on December
8, 1998 as follows:
In addition to the factual, legal and Constitutional defenses we present in this document, the
President has asked us to convey a personal note: What the President did was wrong. As the
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to excuse or sugarcoat that conduct. As we declared in our brief to the House of
Representatives, filed on December 8, 1998, "no fancy language can obscure the
fact that what the President did was morally wrong."2 The point, however, we went
on to say, is that "no amount of rhetoric can change the legal reality that the record
before this [House] does not justify charges of criminal conduct or impeachable
offenses. '
I. INTRODUCTION
I begin with the obvious. Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution gives the House
"the sole [plower of [i]mpeachment,"'' which is to be exercised for, in the language
of Article II, Section 4 "[tlreason, [b]ribery, or other high [c]rimes and [m]isdemeanors." 5
This language has been much analyzed by constitutional scholars and historians
and while its exact meaning may not be entirely certain, it must Signify at the least
that, given the gravity of the remedy at stake and the obvious threat to the separation
of powers that the remedy embodies, the removal of a democratically-elected
President before the expiration of that President's term, is only justified in cases of
the utmost national gravity for acts which threaten the constitutional framework.
The awesome power of the House to begin the process of overturning a democratic
election must be exercised consistently with precedent, reason, and experience.
Unlike in a parliamentary system, the United States President is directly elected by
the entire populace for a set term. The President does not require the support of
Congress and often takes action that is extremely unpopular with the legislative
branch. Professor Ackerman has pointed out that a casual or cavalier approach to
the impeachment process would radically'alter the separation of powers balance:
"Congress could regularly respond to unpopular decisions by seeking to force the
President from office. The result would be a massive shift toward a British-style
system of parliamentary government."
II. CATALYSIS OF THE PROCESS INVOKED BY THE INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL STATUTE
I want to discuss six ways the House of Representatives failed, in my view, to
meet its constitutional responsibilities in the Clinton impeachment. The first failure
was the House's utter passivity in its reaction to the Starr Report. The Clinton
President himself has said, publicly and painfully, "there is no fancy way to say that I have
sinned."
The President has insisted that no legalities be allowed to obscure the simple moral truth that
his behavior in this matter was wrong; that he misled his wife, his friends and our Nation about
the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He did not want anyone to know about his
personal wrongdoing. But he does want everyone-the Committee, the Congress and the
country--to know that he is profoundly sorry for the wrongs he has committed and for the pain
he has caused his family, his friends, and our nation.
Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of
Representatives (Dec. 8, 1998) (available at <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/submission.htm>).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
5. Id. art. Il, § 4.
6. Bruce Ackerman, What Ken Starr Neglected to Tell Us, N.Y. Tnss, Sept. 14, 1998, at A33.
(Vol. 30
CONSTITUTIONAL VANDALISM
impeachment originated and was driven solely by the recommendation of the
unelected, unaccountable and utterly Independent Counsel. This was not a result
contemplated by the framers of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.7 The original
statute did indeed contain a very similar version of today's section 595(c), which
states that "[an independent counsel shall advise the House of Representatives of
any substantial and credible information which such independent counsel receives,
in carrying out the independent counsel's responsibilities under this chapter, that
may constitute grounds for an impeachment."'
However, it appears that Congress, in enacting this provision, was simply trying
to approve formally what had occurred without statutory authorization in 1974
when the Watergate grand jury wished to transmit evidence to the House Judiciary
Committee, which was already considering the impeachment of President Nixon.While the statutory language is ambiguous, there is no evidence its drafters
contemplated that an executive branch officer-an unelected independent
counsel-would be able to originate or catalyze the impeachment of a public
official, particularly a President.
The statute does not identify any standard pursuant to which an independent
counsel might ascertain that particular evidence constituted "grounds for an
impeachment." While the Starr Report genuflected to the view that it was not the
role of the Independent Counsel "to determine whether the President's actions
warrant impeachment by the House,"9 it nowhere articulated any standards relating
to impeachment pursuant to which the lengthy Report was submitted and simply
stated that "the OIC has concluded that the evidence of wrongdoing is substantial
and credible, and that the wrongdoing is of sufficient gravity that it warrants referral
to Congress."'"
The contrast between what happened in 1998 with the Starr Report and what
happened in 1974 is striking. The Watergate special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski,
showed a punctilious regard for both fairness and the impeachment prerogatives of
the House. Before turning the grand jury material over to the House, Jaworski filed
a motion with the district court for permission to transmit grand jury evidence to the
7. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as amended at28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994)). For an analysis of the sparse legislative history of Sec. 595(c), see Julie R.O'Sullivan, The Interaction Between Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. LJ. 2193,2247-49 (1998). Cf United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The notion thatbecause the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification.").
8. 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994).
9. OFFICE OFTHE INDEPENDENTCOUNSEL, REFERRAL FROM INDE ,DENCouNsEL KENETH W. STAR
IN CoNFORMrTY wrrH THE REQUIREMETS OF TrrnL 28, UNrrED STATES CODE, SECTION 595(c), H.R. DOC. No.105-310, at 5 (2d Sess. Sept. 1998) [hereinafter STARR REPORT].
10. Id at 4 (footnote omitted). The STARR REPORT asserts that "[i]n view of the enormous trust and
responsibility attendant to his high Office, the President has a manifest duty to ensure that his conduct at all times
complies with the law of the land." ld. at 7. Majority Counsel Schippers later adverted to this as a standard against
which to judge the President, but it surely proves far too much as a standard for impeachment, since it reads out
of existence the constitutional standard ("treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors"). Prof. HermanSchwartz responds that "[t]his seems plainly wrong-textually, historically, and as a matter of common sense....
Mhe Starr position would remove, for the most minor offenses, the only public official elected by the entireAmerican people, even if it is clear that Americans are overwhelmingly opposed to this." Herman Schwartz, TheTruth About "High Crimes and Misdemeanors," LA. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1998, at M2.
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House Judiciary Committee. " Jaworski's report was not an advocate's brief but was
simply documents, grand jury testimony and a "road map," which merely served as
a guide to the testimony and documents. Chief Judge Sirica allowed White House
counsel an opportunity to be heard on the matter; he carefully reviewed the special
prosecutor's submission, concluding that:
The Report here at issue ... draws no accusatory conclusions .... It contains
no recommendations, advice or statements that infringe on the prerogatives of
other branches of government .... It renders no moral or social judgments. The
Report is a simple and straightforward compilation of information gathered by
the Grand Jury, and no more .... The Grand Jury has obviously taken care to
assure that its Report contains no objectionable features, and has throughout
acted in the interest of fairness.' 2
The Jaworski Report was sent to the House Judiciary Cdmmittee, and it has not
been made public to this day.
The Starr Report, in its content and the circumstances of its release, was, quite
literally, a sensation, and it represented a significant encroachment on the powers
and prerogatives of the House of Representatives because the House allowed it to
shape and drive the impeachment process.
First of all, there was never any judicial review of its content. Long before it was
drafted, the Independent Counsel petitioned the Special Division of the District of
Columbia Circuit for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsels (not the
chief judge of the District Court supervising the grand jury) on July 2, 1998 for
carte blanche authority to transmit whatever information he wanted to Congress. 3
The Special Division entered a sealed order five days later permitting disclosure of
any and all grand jury material that the Independent Counsel "deems necessary" to
comply with the requirements of Sec. 595(c). 4 There was no hearing, and counsel
for the President never had a chance to object or review the report before its
transmission to the House.
And, finally, not to put too fine a point on it, the Starr Report was not a model
of even-handed fairness and judiciousness; it was a document which saw no
ambiguities, expressed no doubts, and gave no quarter. In the words of New York
Times correspondent Linda Greenhouse, it was an "aggressive piece of legal
advocacy. Few of the factual assertions are left to speak for themselves .... [T]his
is a document with attitude. It serves up a worst-case scenario: conversations that
some might find inconclusive, ambiguous or at worst suggestive.., are character-
ized as a criminal obstruction of justice."' 5 The observations of your own Senator
Bingaman deserve quotation because they are so trenchant. On the floor of the
Senate, he declared that the Starr Report
11. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, WATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS 535 (1975).
12. In re Report and Recommendation of June 5,1972 Grand Jury, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1226 (D.D.C.), affd
sub non. Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
13. See Order, In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Assoc. (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Special Division No. 94-1)
(granting Kenneth Starr's Ex Parte Motion for Approval of Disclosure of Matters Occurring Before a Grand Jury,
which was filed under seal).
14. See STARR REPORT, supra note 9, apps., pt. I at 10.
15. Linda Greenhouse, Starr's Aggressive Advocacy, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 1998, at Al.
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should have set out the asserted grounds for impeachment and then summarized
the evidence supporting each ground as well as the evidence against it. Instead,
[Starr] chose to present his report in the format of a narrative where facts are
presented in a manner designed to arouse the greatest public revulsion. The
narrative is one-sided in that it summarizes the evidence damaging to the
President and omits all other. It contains damaging and salacious testimony
concerning the President and others even when that testimony is not relevant to
any asserted ground for impeachment. 6
As it turned out, the very one-sidedness and unfairness of the Starr Report were
useful to us because it backfired badly. When the actual grand jury testimony was
finally released by the House, some weeks after the Starr Report itself, it became
clear what an unreliable document the Report actually was. For example, as Mr.
Ruff and I wrote to Chairman Hyde on September 22, 1998, the Report significantly
distorted the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, quoting it when it suited the OIC's
purposes and downplaying or ignoring it when it did not. Ms. Lewinsky had
consistently maintained that neither the President nor anyone acting on his behalf
ever urged her to lie, about anything. 7 Aware that this would be her testimony, the
OIC did not ask her any questions that might elicit this exculpatory testimony in the
grand jury and ended its interrogation of her without clarifying this key point. After
the OIC prosecutors announced that they didn't have any more questions, it was left
to a grand juror to ask Ms. Lewinsky if she wished to add to, amplify, or clarify her
previous testimony, whereupon Ms. Lewinsky stated: "I would. I think because of
the public nature of how this investigation has been and what the charges [are], that
I would just like to say that no one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised
a job for my silence."'" The Report chose to print over 150 pages of gratuitous and
graphic sexual detail but could not find space for a single sentence quoting Ms.
Lewinsky's sworn testimony which directly contradicted the Report's central
obstruction of justice allegations.
The true purpose of the Starr Report was to embarrass the President, inflame the
public, and stampede the House. And the House allowed its powers to be
encroached upon and its independence to be compromised by its passivity, its
abnegation of independent judgment, and failure to take firm charge of the
impeachment process from the outset. There was no real deliberation or analysis
before the Starr Report was released. The House simply dumped it on the public,
sight unseen, before it had tested its allegations or analyzed the evidence on which
its allegations were ostensibly based.'9 The Starr Report proved radically polarizing,
16. 144 CONG. REc. S10,643 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Bingaman).
17. Letter from Charles Ruff& David Kendall, Counsels for President Clinton, to Henry Hyde, Chairman,
House Judiciary Committee (Sept. 22, 1998) (on file with author).
18.. STARR REPORT, supra note 9, apps., pt. I, at 1161 (grand jury testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Aug. 20,
1998).
19. Senator Bingaman commented that this action came
before the House has even made a determination to begin an impeachment inquiry. The effect
of this action, and possibly its purpose, is to undermine any fair and objective assessment of the
evidence and the allegations. The result is to try and convict the President in the court of public
Spring 20001
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as it was intended to be, and positions hardened before there was any chance for
calm reflection or dispassionate digestion of the real facts. In Watergate, the process
had unfolded "organically, as public and congressional discontent with President
Nixon grew slowly and in tandem."' Former Judiciary Chairman Rodino observed
in a 1998 interview that during the Watergate impeachment proceedings, "[tihere
were many things that we could have released-I won't talk about them now-but
we didn't .... We didn't want to inflame passions. We didn't consider them
relevant to whether or not there were grounds for impeachment."
21
No such restraint was shown in 1998.22
M. STANDARD FOR IMPEACHMENT
The second way the House failed its constitutional duties was by adopting a
totally inappropriate standard for impeachment. Impeachment is an extraordinary
constitutional weapon, properly used only against major wrongs to the body politic.
The standard of "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors" is a very
high one, and for an offense to be impeachable, it must be of the seriousness of
"treason" or "bribery"--otherwise, the constitutional provision, would be an
authorization for a legislative coup d'etat at the whim of the House. The precedents
from England considered by the Framers made clear that the power of impeachment
was only to be used for fundamental offenses against the system of government.
Such offenses were both severe and consisted of wrongdoing directed against the
state, and parliamentary impeachments had occurred in cases of misappropriation
of public funds, interfering in elections, accepting bribes, and various forms of
corruption.23 In short, as Professor Gerhardt has observed, under the English
practice, "the critical element of injury in an impeachable offense was injury to the
State."'
opinion long before there is any opportunity for the President's counsel to counter the
accumulated weight of this evidence.
144 CONG. REC. S 10,643.
20. Jeffrey Toobin, Election Day Calls a Halt to the Night of the Living Dead, NEW YORKER, Nov. 16,
1998, at 31. "[The independent-counsel law has, in effect, handed the initiative to an unelected and virtually
unchecked prosecutor. It wasn't the public's wishes, or Congress's, that set the wheels of impeachment turning.
It was Kenneth Starr's." Id.
21. John Hassell, Rodino Finds No Evidence to Impeach, NEWARK STAR LEDGER, Oct. 28, 1998, at 1.
22. By at least one account, some members of the OIC were concerned about the contents of the Starr
Report prior to the Report's release:
When they saw the narrative that the [OIC] team had produced, [Brett] Kavanaugh and
[William] Kelley went to Starr to object. It had grown into an explicit account, sexual encounter
* by sexual encounter. They had moral, not legal objections. There was detail that was not needed.
Kavanaugh pointed out that they should not be trapped by earlier drafts, when Clinton was still
denying any relationship with Lewinsky. They didn't need to prove what Clinton no longer
denied .... The narrative was extraneous .... Starr rejected their suggestion. "I love the
narrative!" Starr said.
BOB WOODWARD, SHADOW: FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE LEGACY OF WATERGATE 453-454 (1999).
23. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEAcHMEN. THE CONsiTLUTIONAL PROBLEMS 70-77 (1973).
24. Michael 1. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEx. L REV.
1, 84 (1989) (emphasis added)..This was the conclusion drawn by the House Judiciary Committee staff at the time
of the impeachment investigation of President Nixon in 1974. The committee staff determined that in the early
English impeachments, "the thrust of the charge was damage to the state.... Characteristically, impeachment was
used in individual cases to reach offenses, as perceived by Parliament, against the system of government." STAFF
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The Framers plainly intended that impeachment would be available only for the
gravest political wrongs and that the impeachment standard would be a high one.
They rejected a proposal that the president be impeached for "maladministration"
because, as James Madison pointed out, this standard would "be equivalent to a
tenure during the pleasure of the Senate." 5 George Mason stated that impeachment
was necessary to remedy "great and dangerous offenses" not covered by "treason"
or "bribery" such as "[a]ttempts to subvert the Constitution."
Prior to 1998, there were sixteen cases of impeachment by the House, thirteen of
these involving judges, and in every case impeachment was used for serious
breaches of official duties, to punish what George Mason called "great and
dangerous offenses," and "attempts to subvert the Constitution."'27 As Prof. Herman
Schwartz has pointed out, it, has not been used "for purely personal matters. The
impeachment remedy was intended to preserve constitutional government by
removing from office an official who 'subverts' it, not punishing someone who
breaks the law in connection with a private matter."2*
This point was a matter of bipartisan consensus during the Watergate proceed-
ings. In a recent interview, former Judiciary Committee Chairman Rodino noted that
his Committee concluded that "in an impeachment proceeding, a president is called
to account for abusing powers that only a president possesses." 9 Another
participant in the Watergate impeachment proceedings, who would later play a
critical role in the Senate impeachment trial of President Clinton, Trent Lott, a
member of the House in 1974, with less seniority and longer sideburns than he has
now, declared that a President should be impeached "only for serious misconduct
dangerous to the system of government" and not for "general misbehavior.""
In 1974, the House Judiciary Committee proposed five articles of impeachment
against President Nixon and approved three for transmission to the full House.3
One of the defeated articles alleged the signing by President Nixon, under oath, of
a false income tax return. By a bipartisan vote greater than a 2-1 margin, the
Judiciary Committee rejected the tax-evasion article on the grounds that the
allegations simply did not constitute an impeachable offense. 2 Congressman
Railsback, a Republican, opposed the article saying that there is a serious question
as to whether something involving his personal tax liability has anything to do with
[the] conduct of the office of the President.3 Congressman Waldie, a Democrat,
spoke against the article, saying that "this is not an abuse of power" sufficient to
OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 5 (Comm. Print 1974).
25. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 550 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
26. Id. (quoting Col. George Mason). Alexander Hamilton described impeachment as a "method ofnational
inquest into the conduct of public men." THE FEDERAIST No. 65, at 331 (Gary Wills ed., 1982).
27. Schwartz, supra note 10.
28. Id.
29. Hassell, supra note 21.
30. James Bennet & Alison Mitchell, Ghosts of Watergate Haunt IMpeachment Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 1998, at A28.
31. See Debate on Articles of Impeachment: Hearings on H. Res. 803 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. 331, 447, 489, 517, 559 (1974).
32. See id. at 559.
33. See id. at 524.
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warrant impeachment, notwithstanding his belief that "the conduct of the President
in these instances to have been shabby, to have been unacceptable, and to have been
disgraceful even ...",
In 1998, however, the House impeached President Clinton for personal conduct
of the most private nature. The public perceived this throughout the long and dismal
months of the impeachment proceedings. My colleague, Senator Bumpers, made
this point in a devastating fashion during his Senate floor speech:
We are here today because the President suffered a terrible lapse of marital
[fidelity]-not a breach of the public trust, not a crime against society, the two
things Hamilton talked about in Federalist paper, No. 65 ... but it was a breach
of his marriage vows. It was a breach of his family trust. It is a sex scandal.
H.L. Mencken one time said, "[W]hen you hear somebody say, 'This is not
about money,' it's about money." (Laughter)
And when you hear somebody say, "[Tihis is not about sex.," it's about sex.35
Now, sex was not recently invented, and the Framers themselves had to wrestle
with the question of impeachment for lying about sexual misconduct, in a matter
that involved wrongdoing by one of the most illustrious advocates of the Constitu-
tion, Alexander Hamilton. In 1792-1793, when the ink on the Constitution was
barely dry, Congress investigated then Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton for
alleged financial misdealings with James Reynolds, a convicted swindler.36
Members of Congress interviewed Hamilton, including the House Speaker and
James Monroe, the future President. Hamilton admitted to making secret payments
to Reynolds whose release from prison the Treasury Department had authorized.
Hamilton acknowledgea that he had made the payments but explained that he had
committed adultery with Reynolds' wife; that he had made payments to Reynolds
to cover it up; that he had had Mrs. Reynolds burn incriminating correspondence,
and that he had promised to pay the Reynolds' travel costs if they would leave town.
The members of Congress who heard Hamilton's confession concluded that the
matter was private, not public. As a result, they decided that no impeachable offense
had occurred, and that the entire matter should remain secret.3" The Framers thus
did not regard private sexual misconduct, including efforts to cover up that
misconduct, as amounting to an impeachable offense. These wrongs were real and
34. Id. at 548.
35. 145 CONG. REC. 5845 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1999) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). The Wall Street Journal
observed, "[a]s framed by Mr. Starr, the subject matter in the perjury charge still is largely about sex: 'What did
the president touch and when did he touch it,' said Democratic Rep. Barney Frank of Massachusetts." David
Rogers, Livingston Urges Option to Impeachment, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1998, at A24.
36. For a summation of the facts in this matter, see Richard N. Rosenfeld, Founding Fathers Didn't Flinch,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1998, at B9. Rosenfeld also wrote a detailed history of U.S. politics in the last decade of the
eighteenth century. See RiCHARD N. ROSENFELD, AMERICAN AURORA: A DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLtCAN RETURNS
(1997).
37. Although President Washington, Vice-President Adams, Secretary of State Jefferson, and House
Minority Leader James Madison (two of whom had signed the Constitution) all eventually became aware of the
affair, they too maintained their silence. Even after the whole matter became public knowledge some years later,
Hamilton was appointed to the second highest position in the United States Army and was speedily confirmed by
the Senate. See Rosenfeld, Founding Fathers Didn't Flinch, supra note 36.
[Vol. 30
CONSTITUTIONAL VANDALISM
not insubstantial, but to the Framers they were essentially private and therefore not
impeachable. 8
While the popular perception that people frequently lie about sex may be legally
and morally insupportable, the Office of Independent Counsel itself provided an
intriguing example of its own tolerance for such conduct, at least when engaged in
by a friendly and useful witness. It was publicly known that the OIC had given
immunity to one of President Clinton's accusers, Ms. Kathleen Willey, and that Ms.
Willey was the key witness against Ms. Julie Hiatt Steele, whom the OIC
prosecuted on felony charges this past May. At trial, however, it turned out that Ms.
Willey was given immunity not once, but twice, the second time after the OIC found
Ms. Willey had lied to the prosecutors about whether she had had an affair with a
younger man. Willey was asked why she did not originally tell the prosecutors the
truth, and she testified: "I was embarrassed, and I was ashamed of that. '' 39 The Starr
prosecutors decided to give her a second immunity agreement which, in the words
of a recent commentator, "served to excuse her latest round of lies. After all, Willey
had only lied about sex." The jury refused to convict Ms. Steele, against whom
Willey testified, and the charges against Steele were dismissed.4
The adoption by the House of an unprecedented standard of impeachment that
looked to personal and private conduct was, I believe, one reason for the public's
disaffection for the entire impeachment process.42 The media gleefully uncovered
instance after instance of sexual misconduct by various actors in the impeachment
process, some of whom had been quick to throw the first stone. The title of an
article in the September 28, 1998 issue of Newsweek says it all: Out of Con-
trol-Slime Time: In the Capital, Nobody's Safe--and Nobody Knows Where It Will
End.43 Where it all ended, I think, was a sweeping and corrosive disdain by the
public for the massive hypocrisy it saw at work in Washington.
IV. THE POISON OF PARTISANSHIP
The third failure by the House in its impeachment proceedings was the
thoroughgoing partisanship that characterized it. Some partisanship is inevitable in
any impeachment proceeding involving a President, but the 1998 effort to impeach
38. See id. Rosenfeld concludedthat "America's FoundingFathers made itclearthata high federalofficer's
illicit, even criminal, sexual activities as well as bribery, conspiracy and lying to hide them from public view were
neither impeachable offenses under the U. S. Constitution nor even a disqualification from appointment to high
government office." Id.
39. JEFFREY TOOBIN, A VAST CONSPIRACY: THE REAL STORY OF THE SEX SCANDAL THAT NEARLY
BROUGHT DOWN A PRESIDENT 397 (1999).
Willey's lies put Starr's prosecutors in a dilemma. Her immunity agreement stated clearly that
if she didn't tell the truth, her immunity could be withdrawn and she could be prosecuted for
all her crimes-including the lies that broke the agreement. But she was also their last, best hope
to make another case against Clinton. Starr had to choose: hold fast to his oft-repeated insistence
on the truth and void Willey's immunity deal, or ditch the principle and save a witness who
might finally bring down Bill Clinton.
Id. at 397-98.
40. Id. at 398.
41. See id. at 396.
42. See infra note 57.
43. Howard Fineman & Mark Hosenball, Out of Control-Slime Time: In the Capital, Nobody's Safe-.and
Nobody Knows Where It Will End, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 1998, at 34.
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President Clinton was poisoned by a rancorous partisanship. As in the impeachment
of President Andrew Johnson 130 years earlier, partisanship divested the
proceedings of legitimacy in the eyes of the public because the public regarded this
as simply another political food-fight, with much higher stakes. This is a fundamen-
tal misuse of the process. Because the Framers of the Constitution devised a
government consisting of three largely independent branches, it is important that
impeachment decisions be made with a recognition of the rightful independence and
prerogatives of the executive branch, and that it not be simply another political
weapon to be used against a President of the opposing party. Otherwise, obviously,
there is a danger that the executive branch will be subordinate to the Congress, a
result plainly unintended by the Framers. The drafters of the Constitution "believed
that if impeachment was to acquire legitimacy, the charges must be so grave and the
evidence so weighty that members of both parties would agree on the necessity of
removal from office."
The 1974 impeachment proceedings involving President Nixon, while not devoid
of factional wrangling, were bipartisan in a significantly greater way than the 1998
proceedings. Congress' handling of Watergate and the resulting forced resignation
of President Nixon has come to be regarded, in the words of the New York Times
editorial page, "as a model of constitutional process. The fundamental reasons are
that the Congressional consensus to punish Richard Nixon was bipartisan and that
a majority of the American people, including many of his former supporters, wanted
him out of the White House."' 5 Former Judiciary Chairman Rodino recalled that he
was allowed by the Democratic House leadership to pursue an independent inquiry,
which he did in cooperation with Committee Republicans: "John Doar, the majority
counsel, and the staff were instructed to make no inference or partisan
statements."' Both the majority and minority counsel presented summations to the
Committee that analyzed the evidence both for and against impeachment, and both
concluded that there were grounds for impeachment. The Committee votes on the
three articles recommending impeachment were significantly bipartisan, with six
Republicans voting for the first article (making it a 27-11 Committee vote), seven
Republicans voting for the second (making it a 28-10 Committee vote), and two
Republicans voting for the third (with two Democrats voting against, making it a
21-17 vote).47 The two defeated articles went down to a bipartisan vote also, with
nine Democrats voting with the Republican minority against the articles." Finally,
with respect to Article I, after the articles had been sent to the House floor (but
mooted by President Nixon's resignation), ten of the eleven Republicans who had
voted against the article indicated that they would have votedfor it on the floor, in
light of disclosures in just-released Watergate tapes, which had become public just
44. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Editorial, Upsetting the Constitutional Balance, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1998, at
B5.
45. Editorial, For Us, Not Him; Vote No on Impeachment, N.Y. lIMES, Dec. 16, 1998, at A34.
46. Peter Rodino, The Vote That Changed America, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1999, at A19.
47. See IMPEACHMENT oF RICHARD M. NIXON, H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 10(1974). In 1974, there were
21 Democrats and 17 Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee. See id. at 11.
48. See id. at 337-38.
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before President Nixon resigned.49 In the eyes of the public, the Nixon votes for
impeachment could not be simply dismissed as Washington, D.C. "politics as
usual."
Twenty-four years later, things started with appropriate bipartisan rhetoric. On
September 10, 1998, the day after the Starr Report was transmitted to Congress but
before it was publicly released, White House Counsel Chuck Ruff and I met with
Chairman Hyde to discuss what lay ahead. While Chairman Hyde rebuffed our
request to look at the Starr Report before it was publicly released, he volunteered
two principals of bipartisanship that, he said, would govern the House's inquiry. He
said that any consideration of impeachment in the House had to be thoroughly
bipartisan if it was to be accepted by the public, and he also stated that he would not
recommend Articles of Impeachment to the full House unless he was convinced
they had a chance of being approved by the requisite two-thirds majority in the
Senate.5°
These sentiments were wholly appropriate and, indeed, represent a proper
recognition that impeachment is simply not the normal legislative endeavor.5"
However, reality did not match the rhetoric, and a bitter and abiding partisanship
marked the actions of both the Judiciary Committee and the full House. From the
outset, decisions were made in a partisan way, with no attempt to find common
ground or to develop a cooperative approach to the investigation.
It is significant that over 400 historians, both Republicans and Democrats, signed
a joint letter decrying the impeachment drive, declaring that "[t]he theory of
impeachment underlying these efforts is unprecedented in our history." 2 Similarly,
more than 430 law professors, of both parties, issued a joint statement warning
against use of the impeachment power "for partisan advantage" and declaring that
the evidence presented in the Starr Report and summarized by Committee majority
counsel David Schippers did not "cross the threshold" of the constitutional standard
of impeachment.5 3 The number of academic experts weighing in with rare unanimity
is significant, as is the absence of any countervailing statement by opposing
academicians. The scholarly consensus against impeachment was overwhelming
and is a reflection of the raw partisanship that marked the actual impeachment
process itself.
49. See id. at 360-61.
50. Chairman Hyde had earlier declared that "I have no interest in not working in a bipartisan way....
Because the end product will not be trusted. I do not want a partisan witchhunt or a partisan attack." David Espo,
Washington Dateline: Impeachment, Assoc. PRESs DisPATrH (pm cycle), Mar. 26, 1998. In a press release dated
September 9, 1998, the day the Starr Report was sent to the House, Chairman Hyde stated that "[t]he solemn
[constitutional] duty that confronts us requires that we attain a heroic level of bipartisanship and that we conduct
our deliberations in a fair, full and independent manner." See House Judiciary Committee Press Office, Hyde
Statement on Referral of Report from the Independent Counsel (visited April 12, 2000)
<http://www.house.gov/judiciary/090998.htm>.
51. Before the Lewinsky imbroglio, Chairman Hyde remarked that impeachment "is a Draconian act and
ultimately it must be a bipartisan act." Mary Ann Akers, 17 in House Want Clinton Impeached- Barr Leads Charge
to Force Hyde to Begin Inquiry, WASH. TInes, Nov. 6, 1997, at A4.
52. See Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the House Comm on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 334 (1998).
53. See id at 374.
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In 1974, impeachment was considered a solemn subject.54 A bipartisan gravitas
and care led the House Judiciary Committee to spend almost a year in deliberation
and investigation before it voted on articles of impeachment. By contrast, in 1998,
the intensely partisan character of the process led to a discernable lack of
seriousness over the less than three month long inquiry. As a result, the impeach-
ment drive appeared to many to be simply the pursuit of politics by other means.
Elizabeth Drew remarked upon this lack of gravity: "'[tihey are discussing it as
casually,' says one prominent Republican, 'as if they were talking about passing a
highway bill and saying, let the Senate fix it.'ss Carl Bernstein, who had chronicled
Watergate from the beginning, found the mood very different in 1998. "The solemn
business of removing a President was being addressed with all the gravity and
concern for the national weal as a naval-base closing.,
56
The November 1998 elections should have been a wakeup call that the rest of the
country strongly opposed the partisan pursuit of President Clinton.5 ' However, if
anything, the turmoil in the House leadership and the fact that in the next (106th)
Congress the Republican majority would be significantly slimmer exacerbated
partisanship on the Judiciary Committee.
Using every parliamentary maneuver available, the leadership in the 105th
Congress was able to impose party line discipline and complete the proceedings in
a lame duck session before the new Congress was seated. It forced a vote on
impeachment only and blocked any floor vote on censure. Partisanship was
everywhere. The ethics advisor of the Independent Counsel, who had been counsel
to the Ervin Committee during the Watergate hearings twenty-five years earlier,
resigned because, he said, the Independent Counsel had "abuse[d] [his] office" by
becoming an "aggressive advocate" for impeachment rather than an objective
provider of information to the House Judiciary Committee." The closing
54. See Elizabeth Drew, Why Clinton Will Be Impeached, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1998, at A25.
55. Id.
56. See Carl Bernstein, National Disservice: The Triumph of Rank Partisanship, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 27,
1998, at MI.
57. Public opposition to removal of the President remained strong throughout the impeachment process.
Indeed, the President'sjob approval rating actually increased, according to four public opinion polls, immediately
after the House's impeachment vote. See Clinton Rating Near Record High; Handling of Economy Wins 80
Percent Approval, An. J. CONST., Jan. 21,1999, at Al. A number of observers commented on this phenomenon.
Carl Bernstein wrote that "[n]othing inflames either Clinton's enemies or much of the Washington media elite more
than the president's poll numbers since January, which testify to the sophistication and discrimination of most of
the population and their grasp of the national interest." Bernstein, supra note 56. The playwright Arthur Miller
commented, "[blut what is strange and interesting is how the public, that great stallion that is so often led to water,
this time dipped its head but refused to drink, perhaps scenting the stale smell of political manipulation ....
Despite the lashings of almost all the press and the mullahs of the religious right, the people seem largely to have
withheld their righteous anger." Arthur Miller, Salem Revisited, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15,1998, at A31. A Conservative
British MP, Alan Clark, noted that President Clinton "has just this one consolation. The American people, even
though subjected now to months and months of one-sided argument, bogus moralizing and exclusion of the
defendant's case, are still not convinced that their President should go." Alan Clark, Don't Let this Randy Little
Minx Topple the President, EvENING STD. (London), Sept. 15, 1998, at 11. Representative Barr, a member of the
House Judiciary Committee, who later became a Manager for the Senate trial, remarked on the "President's
apparent invincibility in opinion polls .... '[ilt's the Clinton magic mystery tour,' Mr. Barr conceded, sounding
as frustrated as Wile E. Coyote in pursuit of the Presidential Roadrunner." Francis X. Clines, Clinton Foe Is
Doubtful of Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, at A22.
58. See Don Van Natta Jr., Testing of a President: The Overview; Starr Ethics Aide Quits To Protest House
Testimony, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1998, at Al.
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presentations of majority and minority counsel to the Judiciary Committee were
unabashedly partisan, with majority counsel Schippers adding intemperate and
inflammatory personal comments to his summation. There was no even-handed
analysis of possible ambiguities in the evidence-all was black and white. The
Committee votes on the four articles were wholly partisan, with the articles
approved on straight party line votes.59
In 1974, the House Judiciary Committee votes were substantially bipartisan, and
the full House had accepted the Committee's report by a vote of 412 to 3, after
President Nixon resigned.' In 1998, however, the full House was as partisan as its
Judiciary Committee, and while two articles were rejected on the floor, Articles I
and Ell passed on almost a straight party line vote, with only five Democrats voting
for them and five Republicans voting against them.6 In 1974, there had been more
opposite party votes in the Judiciary Committee itself (for two of the three Nixon
articles) than there were in 1998 in the entire House.62
This nakedly partisan process deprived the two articles that were approved of
their legitimacy because the public simply did not regard them as anything more
than part of a relentless political attack on a popular sitting president. "[T]he current
impeachment drive, characterized by strict party line votes and by defiance of
midterm election returns, represents [what Alexander Hamilton called] the 'demon
of faction' and obviously fails the legitimacy test."6' 3
V. INAPPLICABILITY OF GRAND JURY MODEL
The fourth failure of the House was the very model the leadership adopted to
guide its inquiry. Throughout the House proceedings, majority members frequently
likened their task to that of a grand jury---determining probable cause as to whether
a violation had occurred and, if so, transmitting the matter on to the Senate for trial.
Representative Gekas, who would later serve as one of the House Managers at the
Senate trial, posed the following question to the Judiciary Committee: "Is there
probable cause, in other words, on the part of this committee to be able to make a
finding that an article of impeachment on perjury should lie?... [T]hat is what our
duty is, to determine whether there is enough evidence, sufficient and credible, to
be able to present to the trier of fact. That is the only thing before us." 64 Representa-
tive Bryant, who also would later serve as a House Manager in the Senate,
concurred. "[W]hat we have to have is a two-step process ... The first is the
59. There was only one deviation. Rep. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, a Republican, voted against
Article I, which alleged perjury in the President's deposition given in the Paula Jones case. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-
803, at 131. With respect to the other three articles, all 21 Committee Republicans voted for impeachment, while
all 16 Committee Democrats voted against. See id. at 128-130, 132, 134.
60. See CONGRESSIONAL. QUARTERLY, supra note 11, at 772.
61. Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, Clinton Impeached; House Approves Articles Charging Perjury,
Obstruction; Mostly Partisan Vote Shifts Drama to Senate, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1998, at Al.
62. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 11, at 734
63. Schlesinger, supra note 44.
64. The Consequences of Perjury and Related Crimes: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 14 (1998).
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indictment, so to speak, by the House; and then it goes to the Senate to let them
consider it."6
This analogy was widely adopted and used to justify the failure of the House to
independently review evidence or to call witnesses. Chairman Hyde noted that the
Committee had been criticized "for not producing witnesses to cross-examine, as
though this is where the adjudicatory function is .... It is the other way around. We
accuse; [the Senate] adjudicate[s]." Staff Majority Counsel Schippers minimized
the importance of the House's fact-finding role and declared in his summation that
"this is not, as some seem to believe, a trial. It is in the nature of an inquest. Any
witnesses whose testimony is referred to in this proceeding will be subjected to full
cross-examination if a trial results in the Senate. That is the time to cross-examine
and test credibility.""
However, the analogy to a grand jury inquest is fallacious for a number of
different reasons. First, even a grand jury hears witnesses, examines evidence, and
makes credibility decisions." The fact that it renders a final decision on the basis
of probable cause and not evidence beyond a reasonable doubt in no way detracts
from its duty to make a fair and independent assessment of the evidence.
More fundamentally, the analogy to the grand jury trivialized the grave
constitutional responsibility that the House necessarily had to discharge. Impeach-
ment is not the normal legislative decision, because it starts a chain of events which
can result in the removal of a democratically-elected president. Former Sen. George
Mitchell declared that "[tihe stunning assertion by Republican leaders that a vote
to impeach is merely a vote to send charges to the Senate opens the door to easy use
of the impeachment power in the future." 9 The grand jury model was frequently
used to understate and minimize the consequences of the decision made by the
House. The New York Times criticized the Judiciary Committee's insistence that
impeachment could be "undertaken as a kind of 'ultimate censure,' rather than a
somber, considered recommendation that the President be removed. This aberrant
interpretation of constitutional procedure invites promiscuous application of the
65. Id. at 133-34.
66. Id. at 25.
67. Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States: Hearing on H. Res.
581 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 92 (1998).
68. Representative Gekas declared that "[b]ringing in witnesses to rehash testimony that's already concretely
in the record would be a waste of time and serve no purpose at all." See Eric Schmitt, Judiciary Chairman Asks
Clinton to Admit or Deny 81 Findings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,1998, at A25. The point, of course, is that the meaning
and reliability of even testimony "already concretely in the record" is simply unknowable unless the witness is
observed and questioned in an adversarial setting (which the grand jury is assuredly not). Former Watergate
prosecutor Richard J. Davis testified before the Judiciary Committee on December 9, 1998, and observed
as Mr. Starr recognized, he didn't want to give immunity to Ms. Lewinsky unless [his office]
saw her .... So if you are going to make credibility judgments, and as to a number of these
issues there are credibility issues, that is when it becomes important for the person with the
responsibility of making the decision, and that is, in this case, this committee, in my view, to
actually test the credibility of the witnesses.
Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States: Hearing on H. Res. 581 Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 370 (1998) (statement of Richard J. Davis).
69. George Mitchell, Confusion: In Danger ofDiscrediting the House, N.Y. TnIEs, Dec. 16,1 998, at A29.
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impeachment process whenever future Presidents and Congresses find themselves
in unresolvable partisan conflict."'7
Astonishingly, three days after voting in favor of impeachment, four republican
representatives published a letter in the New York Times declaring that they were
"not convinced, and do not want our votes interpreted to mean that we view removal
from office as the only reasonable conclusion of this case."' Perhaps setting a new
standard in constitutional cluelessness, these Representatives, although they had just
participated in the most solemn vote, short of a declaration of war, possible for a
member of the House to make, a vote that by history and logic expresses their view
that the President has committed high crimes and misdemeanors which make him
unfit to hold office, nevertheless urged the Senate to consider "a tough censure
proposal."72
VI. FAILURE TO HOLD EVIDENTIARY HEARING
The fifth failure, and one of the most extraordinary aspects of the Clinton
impeachment proceeding, was that the House voted impeachment without holding
evidentiary hearings or independently collecting its own evidence. Once again, it
was not that the House majority did not verbally recognize its obligation. In a letter
directed to counsel for the President, Messrs. Schippers and Mooney acknowledged
that "[i]mplicit in [our] mandate is the responsibility to independently investigate
and establish all of the relevant facts."' The Washington Post editorialized that
"[w]hile speed is important in the Committee's consideration of this matter, it does
not obviate the need to address as rigorously as possible the questions on which the
evidence is still less than crystalline-[tlhis means deposing some of the central
players in the Lewinsky drama."""
Instead, however, the House undertook impeachment not only without deposing
the central players but also without even checking on, corroborating, or evaluating
the evidence presented by the Independent Counsel. It did not interview witnesses,
depose witnesses, or independently collect evidence. Minority Leader Gephardt
publicly criticized the Committee staff for
not quickly identifying disputed facts and focusing on them.... You can go out
and do depositions with these people. I just don't think it's sensible for the
Congress to just take this thing from Ken Starr and say we assume all this is
true. . . . They could have had the staff at least doing some of the depositions...
They didn't do anything. They sat. 5
Had the House Judiciary Committee done its own evidentiary work in a public and
orderly fashion, it would have had a chance (perhaps) to build public support for
impeachment, and it would also have (perhaps) attracted more bipartisan support.
70. Editorial, supra note 45.
71. Letter to the Editor from Representatives Boehlert, Castle, Gilman, and Greenwood, Impeachment:
Letter on Shift to Censure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1998, at A28.
72. See id.
73. Letter from Thomas E. Mooney & David P. Schippers, House Representatives, to Charles F.C. Ruff,
Gregory B. Craig, & David E. Kendall, Counsels for the President (Nov. 9, 1998) (on file with author).
74. Editorial, Mr. Starr's Testimony...., WASH. PosT, Nov. 22, 1998, at C6.
75. Eric Schmitt, Gephardt Says Republicans Delay Inquiry on Clinton, N.Y K es, Nov. 13,1998, at A24.
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However, the House adamantly refused to undertake such an evidentiary analysis,
preferring to rely instead on the documents turned over to it by the Independent
Counsel.
The reason, in retrospect, is obvious, I think: the House leadership was aware that
if the evidence was independently examined, the charges alleging obstruction of
justice and perjury would collapse and the Independent Counsel's allegations would
be seen for what they in fact were- accusations of private sexual misconduct.
The failure of the Judiciary Committee to present evidence stands in stark
contrast to the careful analysis and painstaking presentation of evidence during the
Nixon impeachment proceedings twenty-four years earlier. Indeed, in 1999 when
the Senate ordered the House record to be printed up to serve as the basis for the
trial in the Senate, it consisted of, with one exception, (the Nov. 19, 1998 testimony
of Independent Counsel Starr) the following: documentation submitted by the
Independent Counsel; documents submitted by counsel to the President; and the
transcripts of debates and non-evidentiary hearings in the Judiciary Committee and
the House. There was no independent evidentiary work product, and what the
Judiciary Committee majority impeachment staff did during all those months
remains an impenetrable mystery, fully justifying the judgment of The Washington
Post: "The proceedings have been a joke; the only substantive witness has been the
independent counsel whose elaborate conclusions as to obstruction, tampering and
the like rest mainly on circumstantial and other evidence insufficient to remove a
President from office. 76
The failure to develop evidence at the appropriate time significantly hobbled the
House Managers' presentation of their case in the Senate. Their arguments for
discovery at that stage, after their Committee had concluded its work and the House
had voted impeachment, had all the logic of Alice in Wonderland-"[s]entence
first, evidence afterwards," as the Red Queen might have declared. 77 The Managers'
belated request for discovery had no credibility, except as a tactic to obstruct the
Senate trial, and the Senate's authorization of the depositions of Ms. Lewinsky, and
Messrs. Jordan and Blumenthal was generous under the circumstances.
Moreover, the failure of the House Judiciary Committee to develop its own
evidence and fully understand the evidence presented in the Starr Report led to
numerous embarrassments in the Senate. For example, the House Managers
developed an elaborate argument with regard to their obstruction-of-justice claims.
The House essentially claimed that a key motivating event was the entry of Judge
Wright's order in the Paula Jones case on December 11, 1997 regarding discovery
in that case which, according to the Managers, "jump started" the effort to obtain
a job for Ms. Lewinsky in exchange for her silence about her relationship with the
President. The Managers produced elaborate charts to make this point, and Manager
Hutchinson, in his oral argument to the Senate, emphasized how dramatic this
causation allegedly was:
76. Editorial, Censure Him, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1998, at C6.
77. See LEWIS CARROuL, ALICE'S ADVEN.JREs IN WONDERLAND 187 (MacMillan 1995): "'Let the jury
consider their verdict,' said the King for about the twentieth time that day. 'No, no!' said the Queen. 'Sentence
first-verdict afterwards."' Il
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And so what triggered [this sudden change of attitude by the President]-let's
look at the chain of events: The witness list came in. The judge's order came in.
That triggered the President to action. And the President triggered Vernon
Jordan into action. That chain reaction here is what moved the job search
along....
Remember what else happened on that day [December 11], again, the same day
that Judge Wright ruled that the questions about other relationships could be
asked by the Jones' attorneys.78
There was only one problem with the Managers' theory of causation-the facts
it was based on were wrong. The President's counsel demonstrated that the meeting
between Jordan and Lewinsky occurred several hours before the Arkansas judge's
ruling, and that the meeting had been set several weeks previously. Moreover, and
most dramatic, Vernon Jordan was not even in the country when the judge
ruled-he was in an airplane, high over the Atlantic.79 One recent commentator
observed that while the
charge that Hutchinson and company 'deceived' the Senate was unfair; the truth
was more banal. The managers never learned the facts as well as Clinton's
defenders did, and guided by the ineffectual Schippers (who had made the same
mistake about December 11 in his own testimony), they spun everything against
Clinton whether or not the facts justified it.'
The failure of the House to develop its own evidence was an inexcusable
institutional irresponsibility.
VII. VIOLATIONS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
The sixth failure of the House was a series of fundamentally unfair procedural
decisions. While the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment may not
technically apply to impeachment proceedings, the essential fairness of such
proceedings is of obvious importance to the popular acceptance of a process that
may result in the removal of an elected president.
The most significant violation of fundamental fairness was the conduct of a
proceeding with important consequences that did not provide an opportunity for the
confrontation of evidence, the cross-examination of witnesses, and the presentation
of defensive evidence in response to specific charges. Under legal rules and
constitutional logic, the burden of proof lay on those in favor of impeachment to
make a clear and convincing case to remove a twice-elected president.
On the only occasion when the Judiciary Committee even purported to offer
evidence, it invited the Independent Counsel himself, who expatiated at length on
the investigation and the witnesses the OIC had examined. However, on cross-
examination, it transpired that Mr. Starr had not examined or been present at any
of the interrogations of Ms. Lewinsky, her mother Ms. Marcia Lewis, Ms. Betty
78. 145 CONG. REc. S234 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999) (statement of Rep. Hutchinson).
79. For a discussion of the relevant evidence, see 145 CONG. REC. S841-42 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1999)
(statement of David Kendall).
80. TOOBIN, supra note 39, at 378-379.
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Currie, Mr. Vernon Jordan or Mr. John Podesta. I then proceeded to ask him: "And
indeed, Mr. Starr, there are 115 individual grand jury transcripts which your office
submitted to the House, and, with the exception of the deposition of the president
of the United States, you were present at none of these grand jury proceedings, were
you?" The Independent Counsel replied, "That is correct."'"
[The] point was clear-and devastating. Starr was the only witness to testify
about the facts of the allegations against the President. Yet Starr had neither
seen the events in question nor interviewed anyone who had. In other words, the
Judiciary Committee was considering the impeachment of the President of the
United States on, at best, a thirdhand recitation of the evidence against him.
Even by the low standards of congressional hearings, it was a remarkably
shabby practice.82
It was also a violation of the fundamental fairness required in an impeachment
proceeding purporting to legitimacy adamantly to refuse to allow the full House to
consider a range of options in addition to impeachment. I recognize that a censure
procedure is not entirely free from constitutional doubt, yet a number of senior and
respected Republican leaders, such as President Ford, and Senator Dole, advocated
it as an option. 3 A censure resolution might well have commanded strong bipartisan
support. At first, Speaker-elect Livingston indicated that he was in favor of allowing
members to vote on an "alternative measure" involving censure so as to "let
everybody have a chance to vote on the option of their choice."" But the hard liners
proved ultimately in control, and the leadership, by parliamentary maneuvering,
proved able to keep censure proposals from reaching the floor and force an up or
down vote on impeachment, with no alternatives." The hard liners succeeded in the
short term. However, the floor vote lacked public credibility because the legislators
had been denied the right to vote their conscience86 and because the public was
strongly against impeachment, though it likely would have supported a censure
proposal.
The House process was also characterized by the presentation of secret
"evidence" to certain Representatives before the floor vote. Four days after the vote,
Majority Whip Tom DeLay declared that "[tihere are reams of evidence that have
81. Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States: Hearing on H. Res.
581 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong 172 (1998).
82. TOOBtN, supra note 39, at 350. The Washington Post remarked that Starr's "testimony was not itself
evidence but a kind of commentary on the evidence, which is no kind of substitute for the committee's own fact-
finding." Editorial, supra note 74.
83. See President Gerald Ford & President James Carter, A Time to Heal Our Nation, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21,
1998, at A29; cf Sen. Robert Dole, A Tough But Responsible Solution, N.Y. TMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at A27.
84. David Rogers, Livingston Urges Option to Impeachment, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1998, at A24.
85. See Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, GOP Blocks Democrats' Bid to Debate Censure in House, WASH.
POST, Dec. 13, 1998, at Al. White House special counsel Gregory B. Craig declared, "It's a sad day for America
when extreme elements of one party seek to impeach the president on a party-line vote in a lame-duck Congress
without allowing members to vote their consciences ....I d
86. The Washington Post editorialized that the denial of the right to vote on censure was
the wrong way to conduct these proceedings, still another exaimple of how the harder liners
among the Republicans make it difficult for the party responsibly to govern. This is one where
the House ought not to be cornered. It ought to be free to get to the result it wants.
Editorial, supra note 74; see also, Editorial, For Us, Not Him: Vote No on Impeachment, N.Y. TMES, Dec. 16,
1998, at A34.
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not been publicly aired and are only available to Members.""7 A more fundamen-
tally unfair tactic can hardly be imagined. After the vote, it was revealed that certain
Republican Judiciary Committee members had invited non-Committee members to
view so-called "evidence" in the possession of the majority staff-"evidence"
which was not contained in the OIC's Referral, nor referenced in the presentations
by Mr. Schippers on October 5, 1998, or December 10, 1998, or set forth in the
House Judiciary Committee Report transmitting the four articles to the full House.88
Apparently, this material contained allegations and rumors that had never been
formally evaluated by either the OIC or Committee staff and which were certainly
not part of the evidence ostensibly supporting the four articles of impeachment. The
New York Times called this "claim of secret evidence . . . an insult to due
process." 9 The Senate, sensitive to the fundamental unfairness of this process,
unanimously ordered that the only evidence which could be referenced by the
House Managers and White House counsel was that contained in the printed
record. 9° The secret lobbying in the House prior to the floor vote showed both a
contempt for the normal evidentiary process and an extreme lack of confidence in
the persuasive power of the evidence actually adduced by the House Judiciary
Committee majority.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Taken as a whole, in the six ways I've identified and in others, the procedures
and standards used by the House of Representatives to impeach President Clinton
were fundamentally unfair. The House abdicated its constitutional role in a reckless
and partisan attempt to impeach and remove a popular sitting president. As The
Economist observed during the impeachment proceedings: "The sense of shame and
sadness that now engulfs many thoughtful Americans comes not so much from
87. Tom DeLay, Congressional Press release, Statement of Tom Delay on the Impeachment Process (Dec.
23, 1998).
88. See Amy Goldstein & Juliet Eilperin, Democrats, GOP Clash Over FBIDocuments, WASH. POST, Dec.
19, 1998, at A36 ("Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee in recent days urged fellow GOP
lawmakers to read sealed documents containing unsubstantiated allegations against President Clinton"); David
Rogers, Clinton Trial May Weigh New Evidence, WALLST. J., Dec. 23,1998, at A16; James Dao, Fearing Senate
May Avert Trial, G.O.P. Invites Study of Evidence, N.Y. TIMs, Dec. 24, 1998, at Al.
89. Editorial, Mr. DeLay Goes Out of Bounds, N.Y. TaMEs, Dec. 25, 1998, at A32. After the House floor
vote on the impeachment articles, Majority Whip Tom DeLay urged the Senators to consider the same nonpublic
evidence (whatever it was) that had apparently been purveyed to wavering House members before the floor vote.
This brazen gambit compounded the original mischief because it was an attempt to infringe the Senate's power to
try articles of impeachment approved by the House. Again, the editorial judgment of The New York Times is
cogent:
Mr. DeLay's notion that evidence can be brought to bear on Senators' decisions even though
it is kept secret from the public is repugnant to any standards ofjustice and to the need for open
procedures in a democracy .... It is simply inappropriate for a House leader to reach across to
the Senate and try to put his thumbs on the scale with hidden material the House had every
chance to bring out in a reasonable form but chose not to.
Id; see also, Editorial, Secret Evidence, WAsH. POST, Dec. 28, 1998, at A24.
90. "Mhe record... will consist of those publicly available materials that have been submitted to or
produced by the House Judiciary Committee... The presentation [by the Managers and by counsel for the
President to the Senate] shall be limited to argument from the record." S. Res. 16, 106th Cong. (1999). On the
whole, the Senate acted with scrupulous fairness during the impeachment trial, which resulted in the President's
acquittal on both articles after a vote on February 12, 1999.
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sympathy with this particular president.., as from worry at the precedents that
have been set for political vendettas against elected presidents in [the] future."9
The bar on impeachment has been drastically lowered. The precedent set by the
Clinton impeachment is a deadly weapon, lying there like a loaded pistol for the
next partisan battle.' Washington makes many laws, and a lot of them aren't
honored, even in Washington, but there is one law that is implacable and enduring:
what goes around comes around. I firmly believe that the next time there is a sharp
policy dispute between a Republican president and a Democratic Congress, the
tocsin of impeachment will be sounded, and it will go like this: They impeached
President Clinton for sex in 1998-we've really got to impeach this president for
(fill in the blank), because that is much more serious than sex. The legacy of this
impeachment is the replacement of the Rule of Law by the whim of the House.
In conclusion, I wish I had the wisdom, insight, or experience to be able to
answer journalist/novelist Joe Klein's question: "How did the Republicans and the
Democrats confuse scandalmongering and endless prosecutions with governing?"93
It is clear that the criminalization of policy disputes and the conversion of political
differences into accusations of criminal wrongdoing have been pioneered and
practiced by both parties. But there are simply boundaries that have to be observed,
between what is impeachable and what is not, between what is criminal and what
is not, and between what is really scandal and what is not.9 In his poem, An Essay
on Man, Alexander Pope wrote: "Honour and shame from no Condition rise. Act
well your part, there all the honour lies." "Acting well your part" means, I think,
acting professionally, as legislators, prosecutors, defense lawyers, in recognition
that gaining the advantage for the moment does not justify inflicting lasting damage
on our system of law. It means that each of these people who take action where law
and politics intersect should recognize and try to apply what the Supreme Court said
long ago about the government's interest in a criminal prosecution, that a federal
prosecutor
91. The Damage Done, ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 1999, at 15. The world today is a dangerous place for the
United States to have an enfeebled President. Arthur Schlesinger has written:
The republic could afford an interlude of congressional government in the 19th century, when
the United States was only a marginal actor on the world stage. Today the United States, the
world's only superpower, is irrevocably involved in international affairs. It plays an
indispensable role in the search for peace in the Middle East, in Ireland, in the former
Yugoslavia. Our executive government must take the lead in preventing the testing and
dissemination of nuclear weapons, in combating the plagues of environmental pollution,
terrorism, drugs, poverty and disease, in containing the global consequences of economic
collapse in East Asia and elsewhere. In such a time, we cannot afford an enfeebled and
intimidated presidency.
Schlesinger, supra note 44.
92. Congressman Peter Rodino, whochaired the House Judiciary Committee during the Nixon impeachment
hearings, recently wrote that his worst fear, after the 1998 impeachment, "is that the House Republicans who drove
the Clinton impeachment have cast down a gauntlet of partisanship that future majorities will feel inspired, if not
obligated, to pick up." Rodino, supra note 46.
93. Joe Klein, The Town That Ate Itself, NEw YORKER, Nov. 23, 1998, at 79.
94. The media is, of course, dismally complicit. Joe Klein remarks on "the new, witlessly contentious
television sound-bite shows: 'Groups' and 'Gangs' of journalists screaming at each other and making facile
judgments about complicated issues." Klein, supra note 93, at 89. See generally JAMES FALLOWS, BREAKING THE
NEws: How Tm MEDIA UNDERMN E AMERIcAN DEMocRAcy (1996); THOMAS PATTERSON, OUT OF ORDER
(1993).
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is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.9
95. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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